

An overview of Timor Leste's foreign policy

ZACARIAS DA COSTA

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Timor Leste

The successful use of diplomacy in Timor Leste's long struggle for self-determination is well recognized, and the role of the diplomatic front is acknowledged alongside the clandestine front and armed resistance for achieving independence for its people. Timor Leste's Constitution expressly states that the country shall promote the establishment and development of relations of friendship and cooperation with all peoples and states and underscores peaceful means of conflict resolution.

Timor Leste's geo-strategic location between Indonesia and Australia and within the grid of influence of major powers such as the United States and China, coupled with its own fragilities as a small island nation with specific developmental needs, requires a foreign policy that is practical in nature. Its foreign policy must be capable of positioning Timor Leste to strategically balance the influence

of major regional and international powers, while benefiting the country's development and enabling Timor Leste to contribute to the community of nations as a sovereign and productive country in its own right. To sum up, the pillars of our foreign policy are development, diplomacy and defense.

Our foreign policy gains added importance, as a means of ensuring national security and territorial integrity, and at the same time promoting cooperation arrangements that can help develop Timor Leste. The existence of important natural resources such as oil and gas places Timor Leste under the spotlight of resource-hungry economies and major oil and gas companies, and requires astute and careful management.

It is in light of all these factors, as well as its historical ties, that Timor Leste has become a member of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), that Timor Leste is actively pursuing full membership of ASEAN, and participates in the Pacific Islands Forum as well as in relevant meetings of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), such as the interfaith dialog. CPLP member states have always been our natural allies and we are happy to see that two prominent members of the Lusophone community are now members of the Security Council.

The next 12 months are going to be crucial for us as we look to Indonesia's Presidency of ASEAN as an opportunity to initiate the formal arrangements for Timor Leste's accession. This would culminate in a new phase in our nation's history, as Timor Leste would become a full member of ASEAN in 2012, at the same time as the withdrawal of the UN following our general elections.

The year of 2010 marked a milestone in Timor Leste's affirmation as a nation in the international arena and for its diplomacy. A Timorese woman was elected to the CEDAW Committee and Timor Leste was elected to the board of the new UN Agency, the UN Woman. These important steps are Timor Leste's way of giving back after benefiting greatly from international assistance. Timor Leste has also been very pleased to be able to extend its solidarity to countries affected by natural disasters such as Haiti, Portugal, Indonesia, and most recently Australia.

Today, Timor Leste has formal diplomatic relations with almost every country. Gradually but steadily, as human and financial resources allow, Timor Leste has been expanding its diplomatic representations in key countries and multilateral organizations. There is a permanent representative at the level of ambassador at the UN in New York, in Geneva, at the EU in Brussels and with



the CPLP which also represents Timor Leste in the UNESCO. Bilaterally, Timor Leste has opened embassies in Bangkok, Brazil, Brussels, Canberra, Cuba, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Lisbon, Luanda, Manila, Maputo, Pretoria, Seoul, Singapore, Tokyo, and Washington. In the near future, we will concentrate our efforts on expanding our representation in the ASEAN countries, where Timor Leste is lacking a presence.

On key international issues, Timor Leste has consistently taken positions of principle and voiced its position publicly. The positions assumed by Timor Leste have been based on a multitude of factors such as national and strategic interest, local, regional and global security and stability, international law and its historical background. The following are some examples:

Western Sahara – Timor Leste fully supports the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people. Timor Leste views this struggle as having the same historical background to the Timorese struggle for independence. As we enter the UN's Second Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, Timor Leste remains concerned that so many Non-Self Governing Territories are still not free and have not exercised their right to decide freely on their own future.

Palestine – We support a two state solution that provides for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side peacefully and in security. We also support the Quartet's efforts and encourage the parties to conclude negotiations.

North Korea – Timor Leste condemns the development of weapons of mass destruction and therefore calls upon nations developing nuclear material to use it exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Cuba – Timor Leste has publicly condemned the economic embargo imposed by the US on Cuba. Timor Leste has always voted in favor of the UN resolutions condemning it.

Myanmar – Timor Leste favors an active dialogue and engagement that encourages Myanmar authorities

to proceed with the seven-point roadmap to democracy.

Timor Leste faces many challenges in our nation building effort, and whilst an important part of our focus will continue to be our national development, we are optimistic about the future and our potential to make a positive contribution regionally and internationally. Timor Leste remains fully committed to human rights and the rule of law and democracy. Human rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women are key issues in our foreign policy agenda. As we work towards consolidating a cooperation agenda that will bring development and prosperity for our people, we will not by any means forget our responsibility to regional and international security, stability and peace.

Dilma Rousseff and Brazil's foreign policy: big shoes to fill

OLIVER STUENKEL

Institute of International Relations,
University of São Paulo

If one word can summarize Dilma Rousseff's promises during last year's electoral campaign, it is 'continuity'. A vote for Rousseff, former President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva famously declared on the campaign trail, was a vote for him. Lula, who enjoyed approval ratings of more than 70% until his last day in office, thus succeeded in transferring his popularity to his handpicked successor and former chief of staff. Yet while domestic policies are indeed unlikely to change under President Rousseff, her foreign policy strategy

is inevitably bound to differ to some degree, considering how strongly Brazil's foreign policy was shaped by Lula's personality. In addition, Dilma Rousseff will face new international challenges that make merely copying her predecessor's strategy impossible. So what can the world expect from Brazil in the next years?

The fact that Dilma has never held elected office certainly makes predictions more difficult. Yet appointments to top jobs and early statements made during the first weeks of her presidency provide useful clues. Dilma's decision to keep Marco Aurélio Garcia as special foreign policy advisor is as much a sign of continuity as her appointment of Antônio Patriota as Foreign Minister. Patriota, a seasoned diplomat who has served as Brazilian ambassador to Washington D.C., has worked with his predecessor for over a decade, and is unlikely to pursue policies different from those in the Lula administration. We can therefore expect continuity on broad issues such as regional policy and trade. Furthermore, Brazil will continue to seek a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Perfect continuity, however, is hardly possible given the former President's unprecedented personal involvement in foreign policy making. No other President in Brazil's history had traveled as much as Lula, none attended as many international conferences or was as visible internationally as the former union leader. Aside from Brazil's economic growth, it was also thanks to Lula's charisma that Brazil emerged as a key international player with considerable weight. Rather than engaging in costly yet necessary political battles on the domestic front – regarding for example pension and tax reform – Lula preferred to ride the wave of growth-fuelled popularity, leaving the task of confronting Brazilians with potentially difficult truths to his successor.

In contrast, Dilma is far from charismatic and unlikely to ever develop Lula's personal star power around which Brazil's visibility was



built. While Lula used his upbringing in poverty as a key element in his attempts to turn into the leader of the world's poor nations, Dilma has recognized that her priorities are at home rather than on the international stage. Reducing poverty and improving health care and education are high on the agenda, as is improving the country's underdeveloped infrastructure. Pressure to succeed in this area is particularly high as Brazil will host the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, and Brazilians are keen to avoid the negative propaganda that India received for the poorly organized Commonwealth Games in 2010.

On the economic front, Rousseff needs to find a way to reduce public spending and to lower inflation, since high inflation may erode the support for her among the poor, her staunchest allies. As a consequence, she will probably be less visible internationally than Lula. Her decision to decline an invitation by President Barack Obama to come to the United States prior to assuming office supports this interpretation, as does her absence at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January. Brazil's role in international affairs has also changed. While Lula frequently blamed evil imperialist institutions for economic ills even at a time when Brazil had already turned into a lender to the International Monetary Fund, President Rousseff will find it more difficult to portray her country as an economic underdog. Under Rousseff, Brazil will continue to position itself as a 'leader of the South', but this will be ever more difficult as Brazil's interests increasingly diverge from those of poor developing countries. In addition, not all emerging powers are necessarily Brazil's natural allies. While Chinese high demand for soy and iron ore kept Brazil afloat during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, with China becoming Brazil's most important trading partner, there is growing concern that Brazil may turn into a mere raw material supplier to China. Rather than viewing the

world in a North vs. South dichotomy, Dilma needs to employ a more nuanced framework. The BRICs, for example, may be a visible platform for emerging powers, but given the diverging interests of its members on most issues, it is unlikely to turn into a substantive alliance.

In an increasingly complex world in which Brazil is no longer seen as the 'new kid on the bloc', Rousseff will probably be less ideological and more pragmatic than her predecessor. She is unlikely to unnecessarily antagonize the United States, for example by continuing Brazil's ambivalent stance towards the dictatorial regime in Iran. While Lula told Iranian protesters after the election in June 2009 to "just get over it", comparing them to sulking soccer fans, Dilma may take a less forgiving stance. In one of her first interviews as President, she called the practice of stoning women "medieval" and stressed Brazil's commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. She thus implicitly distanced herself from her predecessor's accommodating stance towards Iran.

Rousseff, who was herself tortured during Brazil's military regime, may possibly be more critical of autocratic leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, although she will most certainly do so in a subtle way. This shows that those who predict that President Rousseff will merely be a puppet while Lula continues to pull the strings in the back underestimate her ability to claim power and assume responsibility. Comparisons between Rousseff and Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's President and placeholder for Vladimir Putin until the latter is ready to return, are thus misguided. Despite her lack of political experience, Dilma will devise her own foreign policy strategy, and only time will tell how much attention she can pay to international issues given the formidable challenges she faces on the domestic front.

Portugal's participation in peace missions: a dwindling foreign policy priority?

MARIA DO CÉU PINTO

Assistant Professor, University of Minho

In the context of budgetary austerity, the cost of peacekeeping is increasingly difficult to manage. Still, *per capita*, Portugal is one of the most significant European contributors to international peacekeeping operations around the world. It presently ranks 41st on a list of 115 countries contributing to the United Nations (UN) peace operations.

Portugal is currently the 7th country in the European Union (EU) that contributes most to UN peace operations, which is a significant demonstration of the effort expended by a small country with limited resources. During the first half of 2009 alone, Portugal had 862 troops deployed abroad, with the Armed Forces committing formed units and members of the three military branches to 16 operations in different continents, under the aegis of NATO, the EU and the UN.

Portuguese participation in peacekeeping missions has made a great leap forward since 1991. In the 1990s, there were three conflicts in which the Portuguese Armed Forces were engaged more meaningfully: Angola, Mozambique and the ex-Yugoslavia. In perspective, since then Portugal has committed more than 25 thousand soldiers, who participated in peace missions in over 30 different operations, covering all the continents. The multiplicity of forces used, as well as the diversity of the locations of their projection, reflect the ambition and the effort made by



Portuguese governments in the last 15 years. It has not always been that way: in the aftermath of the First World War, Portugal adopted a policy of neutrality and non-interventionism which lasted until it entered the European Community in 1986.

According to the priorities established by the current government, Portugal has participated in all major international military operations and missions of crisis management of the UN, NATO and the EU. Currently, Portuguese Armed Forces are involved in three major international missions: Kosovo and Afghanistan in support of NATO, and in Lebanon, supporting the UN.

However, with the reduction of the Bosnia and Kosovo missions, which are taking place against the background of a serious economic and financial crisis, the Portuguese government faces pressures to cut down its budget on defense. Facing a debt crisis, Lisbon looks set to slash 11.1% off its defense budget and might cut back on important areas, like peacekeeping missions. As far as Bosnia is concerned, Portugal has steeply reduced its participation in the EU military mission since 2007. In the peak period, between 1996 and 1997 Portugal had more than 900 troops there; now there are only 14. The mission in Bosnia, where ten years ago Portugal had 8000 troops deployed, was the oldest continuously held deployment abroad.

As for NATO's peacekeeping force in Kosovo, the reduction in Portuguese troops follows NATO's decision to slash its presence by half until next spring. The decision marks the adaptation of KFOR to a deterrent presence. The reduction is due to the improvement of security conditions and the fact that local institutions are increasingly capable of assuming responsibility for security tasks.

Portuguese participation in peace support operations is the result of the changing security environment. A major argument advanced since the 1990s is that defense matters, and above all international security must

be thought of in an international, cooperative framework.

That participation has been instrumental in the promotion of some of Portugal's key foreign policy objectives, particularly in areas of national strategic interest, like Timor Leste, Africa and Latin America. Historically, three cases helped mould Portugal's current peace efforts, and set priorities in the direction of Portuguese-speaking countries: Angola, Mozambique and Timor Leste. After major involvements in Angola and Mozambique, Portuguese governments have a clear preference for conflict prevention in Africa, including through ESDP civilian missions, rather than an involvement in military crisis management operations.

It is clear, when speaking of peace missions, that one of the top priorities is helping the former colonies. Keeping the peace in Portuguese-speaking countries is not only a moral duty, due to longstanding ties, but is also an opportunity to preserve Portugal's leverage in those countries.

Portuguese participation in operations in Africa reflects the priority that Portuguese foreign policy has always given to this region and represents an area where Portugal has a say. This is due mainly to Portugal's successful efforts over the years to mend fences with the former colonies and to consolidate pragmatic and fruitful relations. It is also an asset in terms of Portugal's standing in international relations.

Another former Portuguese colony, Timor Leste was Portugal's most significant involvement in any UN peacekeeping mission. Timor was undoubtedly one of the largest diplomatic struggles Portugal has ever been engaged in, assuming a leading role in the fight for the right to self-determination of the Timorese people. Against the dominant political tide, Portugal committed all its diplomatic efforts to keep the Timor Leste issue on the international agenda and persuade

the international community that the time for Timor Leste's independence had arrived. Largely for historical and emotional reasons, Timor Leste will remain a priority for Portuguese defense, foreign and aid policies.

Portugal has also been involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2002. The national contingent numbers will rise to about 253 soldiers, the highest since the start of national commitment. Portugal is keeping its pledge made at NATO's summit in April 2009 to supply additional troops, to more than double its ISAF troop contribution, to oversee training for the Afghan army and police mission in view of the transition phase. Portugal has also been sustaining an Engineering Company (146 elements) in Lebanon since October 2006, in support of UNIFIL. The rationale for this mission four years on has been criticized by the opposition.

The greatest threat to peace operations in the years ahead may not come from individual atrocities. Rather, a mix of financial pressures and gaps in military resources may cut off the money, troops and hardware peace missions need. Costs with missions have risen sharply in 2009, reaching a record-high €96.3 million. Costs have decreased by 21.2% in 2010, reaching €75 million. The government has already pledged that next year it will maintain its commitment to peace missions, an expenditure of about €150 million. Defense budget cuts will be significant, but Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva has stated that these cuts will not apply to peace missions abroad. However, proposed budgetary measures to keep tight control on spending on defense are expected to restrict Portugal's involvement in future peace missions.



A stabilization mission in Guinea-Bissau: the illusive panacea?

PEDRO SEABRA

Portuguese Institute for International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Throughout the years, Guinea-Bissau has constantly proved itself to be the epitome of political and social instability, with the vulnerability of the state's institutions frequently exacerbated by the local military's attempts to subvert the constitutional order and the rule of law. In that order, the events of April 1st 2010 were hardly surprising. Indeed, the actions of Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff General António Indjai – including the incarceration of his superior, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General José Zamora Induta, the temporary arrest of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and the release of former Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto – only appeared to reinforce a well-established notion of how fragile the political-military situation remained in Guinea-Bissau.¹

Despite constant calls from the international community for a return to order, the following months proved that stability would be hard to attain, especially since Indjai's moves were subsequently consecrated by his promotion to Armed Forces Chief of Staff, basically confirming the perilous balance between the political and military class on the ground. But despite this *fait accompli*, the situation was far from secure as tensions remained consistently high. In that order, the idea of a possible international stabilization mission – intended to provide some much needed security and help reenergize the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process – began to be floated around, as an opportunity for the surrounding community and interested partners – among them Angola, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) clearly stood out – to get involved with the fate of Guinea-Bissau.

With recent reports indicating that such an undertaking might finally materialize, the subject takes on renewed interest, regarding both the arduous path to its implementation and its actual purpose and feasibility in

the wider context of Guinea-Bissau's apparently endless cycle of uncertainty and instability.

The road reluctantly taken

A few days after the half-successful coup of April 8th, when facts were still murky at best and the political scenario was far from stable, President Malam Bacai Sanhá took his chances by traveling abroad. In this context, any visit could come at a high price of forfeiting his power while the coup evolved but in this particular case, it was certainly worth the risk. Indeed, Sanhá travelled to Luanda where he met with his Angolan counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos, to whom he requested cooperation from the Angolan Armed Forces to train – and hopefully discipline – Guinea-Bissau's military, under the framework of the ongoing SSR efforts. The significance of this encounter should not be underestimated. The message conveyed was simple enough: Angola was being asked to play a central role in defusing the crisis at hand by exercising its political and military clout while helping a Lusophone peer. Eight days later, these ties were again further reinforced when Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva travelled to Luanda, where together with his counterpart Cândido Van Dúnem, both countries began to lay the ground for a cooperation agreement in the defense domain.

On the other hand, ECOWAS was also not totally idle. Throughout May, the regional bloc dispatched a fact-finding mission to Bissau, composed by the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff of Liberia, Togo, Ghana and Cape Verde, and meant to assess the country's political situation. However, as mentioned above, the crisis gained new contours when on June 25th President Sanhá confirmed Indjai in the Army's top post. In the following 28th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on July 2nd in Sal Island, regional leaders were swift to express "deep concern" over such a move while urging the promotion of "favorable conditions that would enable ECOWAS to resume its efforts at mobilizing bilateral and multilateral partners

¹ For a complete analysis of the facts surrounding the coup attempt see Paulo Gorjão, "Guinea-Bissau: The Inescapable Feeling of Déjà-Vu" (IPRIS Policy Brief, No. 2, April 2010).

to support Guinea Bissau”.² Above all, the surrounding neighborhood sought to prevent further escalation in tensions between political and military leaders, likely to affect nearby countries and instigate similar disturbances in their backyards.

Consequently, calls for a deeper involvement by the international community began to reach new heights, as exemplified by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s appeal “for strengthened engagement by key partners, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP and the European Union”.³ By the end of July, pressure was thus increasing on local civilian authorities to rein in their troublesome military, understood as the main obstacle to the country’s peace and stability. Still, questions remained as to the internal capacities to carry on such task – as previous SSR attempts had repeatedly proved ineffectual – and in that sense rumors concerning a possible international mission that could assist national authorities in their intended reforms, increasingly began to take shape.

The first concrete and public proposal surfaced on the eve of the CPLP’s VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government on July 23rd in Luanda, regarding a possible common Lusophone intervention in Guinea-Bissau. Although Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado promptly expressed his opposition – arguing that the ultimate responsibility and legitimacy lied with the UN⁴ –, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos stated that no options should be excluded in the process of supporting Guinea-Bissau, including a military one – although always strictly dependent on a formal request by national authorities.⁵ Again, Angola was seen as taking the lead in this matter by putting

the institutional weight of the CPLP behind the Bissau-Guinean civilian government, as the country timely assumed the rotating presidency of the organization.

Following the intense pressure that emanated from ECOWAS, the CPLP and the AU’s successive summits – the latter in Kampala on July 27th –, President Sanhá finally convened the National Defense Council on August 1st. This time around, political and military authorities “agreed in principle” to welcome an international stability force. Although details were sketchy at first, a few days

later, the Presidency clarified that such a mission would not comprise a military detail but would rather consist of military-civilian experts, restricted to the SSR process.

Indeed, urgent support to continue the planned reforms was needed, especially after the EU decided on August 2nd not to renew its own SSR mission, in light of these unsettling internal developments. More than ever, Guinea-Bissau needed to convince the international community that it was determined and willing to curb the excessive power that the local military exercised over the country’s daily life.

To that end, on August 9th, a CPLP delegation – including representatives from Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde and Portugal – arrived in Bissau to assess the possibility of the Community’s involvement in the stabilization mission. On the 24th, President Sanhá met with Cape Verde’s Defense Minister Cristina Lima,

and the next day with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. The main topic was one and the same: possible contributions to the stabilization mission. Further contacts were also made on the margins of the United Nations 65th General Assembly. Mozambican Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói, for example, explicitly expressed his country’s willingness to participate in any kind of undertaking that would help Guinea-Bissau deal with its internal issues once and for all.⁶

Still, Angola remained the most coveted partner as exemplified by the consecutive visits of both Indjai and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior to Luanda in early

Angola remained the most coveted partner as exemplified by the consecutive visits of both António Indjai and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior to Luanda in early September. The ability to simultaneously – although not jointly – attract opposing/conflicting sides confirmed the consensual status it continued to hold among Bissau-Guinean elites.

2 ECOWAS Commission, “Final Communiqué” (28th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Sal, 2 July 2010).

3 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country” (24 June 2010).

4 “CPLP: MNE português contra força de paz lusófona na Guiné-Bissau” (*Lusa*, 22 July 2010).

5 “CPLP: José Eduardo dos Santos não exclui nenhuma hipótese para resolver problema da Guiné-Bissau” (*Lusa*, 23 July 2010).

6 “Guiné-Bissau quer força de Estabilização” (*O País*, 6 October 2010).



September.⁷ The ability to simultaneously – although not jointly – attract opposing/conflicting sides confirmed the consensual status it continued to hold among Bissau-Guinean elites. The results soon followed. Angola's Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Francisco Pereira Furtado announced that he would send military and police officials to Guinea-Bissau to evaluate the type of involvement in the SSR process and identify Guinea-Bissau's needs.⁸ Furthermore,

on September 10th, the respective Defense Ministers finally concluded and signed a new Technical and Military Assistance Protocol, heralding greater cooperation in this area between both countries.⁹

On other front, ECOWAS carried out an Extraordinary Heads of State and Government Summit in Abuja on September 17th, specifically focused on Guinea-Bissau's situation. Probably aware of Angola's growing influence and wishing to ascertain the region's own resolution capabilities, ECOWAS Chairman and Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan sought to assume a greater leadership role in this matter by stating that "the formal responsibility for solving Guinea-Bissau's problem lies with us".¹⁰ However, the physical and logistical limitations were notorious and therefore a full-blown military stabilization mission was out of the question. ECOWAS opted instead to put its institutional weight behind the SSR process: the ultimate goal would then be to cut 1.500 ranks from the Bissau-Guinean military, at a total cost of US\$70 million.

Either way, international support appeared to be on the rise for such a mission. On September 27th, while

meeting with President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso in Brussels, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior stated once again that the stabilization force already had a go-ahead by the official authorities,¹¹ and a few days later President Sanhá endorsed a letter to President Jonathan officially asking for ECOWAS support and assistance in relaunching SSR activities.¹²

Right from when it first surfaced, the alleged intervention force has been consistently clouded in doubts as to its actual purpose. Would it comprise military forces, aiming at providing protection to civilian leaders? Would it take a more advisory role, essentially taking on the responsibilities of the EU's ill-fated SSR mission? Or would it imply a full 'troops on the ground' solution as a way to finally circumvent the unsubordinated military?

All these endeavors however were brought to a standstill when on October 7th Bubo Na Tchuto was reinstated by presidential decree, and under proposition from the government, as Navy Chief of Staff. International uproar soon followed, and again doubts arose regarding the viability and the timeliness of a hypothetical stabilization mission. At least publicly, official talks about such a project were then apparently put on hold, symptomatic of the visible rewarding of the perpetrators of April's turmoil. However, it was clear to all that a 'foreign compromise' would not be discarded that easily.

A quick fix or the right prescription?

After such a myriad of official visits and declarations, calls for intervention and public statements of support, one would think that nine months later, the cited international stabilization mission had already met some progress in its implementation or at least

showed some signs of life. But as the international community remained helpless to prevent Guinea-Bissau's top officials from acknowledging the *status quo* imposed by Indjai and Na Tchuto – in clear violation of the country's democratic and constitutional order – it became clear that the dispatch of a joint force of experts on SSR procedures would be the only possible contribution that external partners could effectively give. Still, there was one final hurdle that the international community would simply not accept to go on indefinitely:

7 Lassana Cassamá, "Guiné-Bissau: Carlos Gomes Júnior e António Indjai em Angola" [Jornal Digital, 10 September 2010].

8 "Angola envia missão técnica militar à Guiné Bissau" [Angop, 8 September 2010].

9 Garrido Fragoso, "Acordo garante apoio aos militares da Guiné" [Jornal de Angola, 11 September 2010].

10 "ECOWAS extra-ordinary summit on Guinea Bissau opens" [Pana Press, 17 September 2010].

11 "Acordo da Guiné-Bissau para a presença de uma força de estabilização internacional no país" (RFI, 27 September 2010).

12 "Presidente divulga carta à CEDEAO para esclarecer que não pediu missão militar" (Notícias Lusófonas, 1 October 2010).

the detention of now former Army Chief of Staff Zamora Induta. In late December, the EU even went as far as to announce the start of political consultations with Guinea-Bissau, under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement – which allows the EU to partially or totally suspend cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries that are guilty of serious violations of democratic principles – as a way of further pressuring local authorities.¹³ One way or the other, it must have had some kind of effect because days later, Induta was finally released after eight months in prison – although still prohibited from leaving the country.¹⁴

Be as it may, this political gesture of goodwill did not exactly resurrect the ‘stabilization mission panacea’ as its idea never really faded away. Indeed, from the start it was visible that a great part of the international community and certain sectors of the Bissau-Guinean society fervently believed that any kind of foreign presence on the streets of Bissau would automatically entitle some sort of institutional buffer between the vulnerable political class and the disobedient military officials. However, that came down to nothing more than wishful thinking, at best. As it so happened, this option had already been adopted in the past, with notoriously ineffectual results. After the 1998/1999 civil war and the Abuja Peace Agreements that followed – brokered by the CPLP and ECOWAS – an ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) peacekeeping force was dispatched to Guinea-Bissau. Mainly composed of Togolese forces, it quickly proved unfit and incapable of stopping the country from returning to conflict and violence.¹⁵ In other words, there is no guarantee that this time around an international presence in Guinea-Bissau would prove any different.

Ultimately, Bissau-Guineans would be wise not put their absolute trust on a ‘miraculous solution’. The idea of a stabilization force has been frequently used as a stalling tactic by local politicians more interested in keeping the international community attached to the country’s fate than actually providing and building the necessary conditions for a mission of this sort.

Such a daunting outcome, however, is always dependent on the level and the kind of commitment on the table, which leads to a second misunderstanding in this matter: the actual composition of the cited stabilization mission. Right from when it first surfaced, the alleged intervention force has been consistently clouded in doubts as to its actual purpose. Would it comprise military forces,

aiming at providing protection to civilian leaders? Would it take a more advisory role, essentially taking on the responsibilities of the EU’s ill-fated SSR mission? Or would it imply a full ‘troops on the ground’ solution as a way to finally circumvent the unsubordinated military? Doubtful declarations made by the authorities and in particular by President Sanhá did little to help answer these queries but currently, every indication points that it is bound to focus on SSR support, helping to identify entry-points to adjust and resize Guinea-Bissau’s Armed Forces. In that sense, it is worth asking how this mission will differ from the EU’s own efforts. Predicting that this international mission will help propel further reforms in Guinea-Bissau’s security apparatus is presently nothing more than a mirage, especially given all that took place the past year. At the moment, nothing guarantees that this new endeavor would succeed where the European Union failed. But even if it indeed comes to life, the success of any international forces would also be contingent to their full acceptance by – at least – the majority of the political and social spectrum of Guinea-

Bissau’s society. Despite the official endorsement by the ruling African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the remaining main political forces – the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) and the Republican Party of Independence for Development (PRID) – have so far clearly expressed their opposition to this proposal. Furthermore, the PAIGC of both President Sanhá and Prime Minister Gomes Júnior is hardly coherent in itself as the political divergences between the two leaders are sufficiently well known and documented. The events of 2010 bluntly brought these political animosities into front display and therefore do not bode well for the supposedly unified ruling that a serious SSR mission demands. Recent attempts to mend these ties may

13 “Comissão Europeia propõe início de consultas com autoridades da Guiné Bissau” (*África 21*, 20 December 2010). This proposal would be later confirmed and enacted by the EU’s Foreign Ministers Council on January 31st 2011, although it fell short from applying individual sanctions to both Indjai and Na Tchuto.

14 “G. Bissau ex-military chief released from prison” (*AFP*, 23 December 2010).

15 See Nelson Herbet, “Guiné-Bissau: Força de estabilização em terreno movediço” (*Novo Jornal*, 8 August 2010).



end up contributing to the evolution of this context but given the recent history, legitimate doubts are bound to remain.¹⁶

Conclusion

When taking every factor into consideration and with no new developments on the ground, one would think that the idea of a stabilization mission had been quietly shelved and forgotten by an international community entangled with more pressing crises. Indeed, despite the flagrant powder keg that Guinea-Bissau constantly represents, the last months of 2010 presented some sort of tense stability for the local population; even the IMF and the World Bank agreed in December to pardon US\$1.2 billion of the country's total foreign debt.¹⁷

But on January 6th 2011, Guinea-Bissau grabbed the spotlight once more when the AU's Special Representative Sebastião Isata announced that a joint stabilization mission composed by the AU, ECOWAS and the CPLP would finally arrive in February to the country. Afterwards, he gave more details by stating that the mission would comprise a military detail and would seek to create a "republican, professional and democratic Guinean army". Furthermore, a team of Angolan and Mozambican jurists would travel to the country to help draft legislation on drug trafficking in particular, and on the security sector in general. On top of that, he also left the door open for the creation of a possible Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Guinea-Bissau, based on the South-African experience.¹⁸

Still, even though the magnitude of this announcement is not to be taken lightly, it continues to leave many questions unanswered. The level of effective cooperation and coordination between every cited organization or the existence of internal conditions for the viability of a useful TRC are just a few examples worth mentioning.¹⁹ Likewise, showcasing an almost traditional pattern of official disconnection on these issues, Prime Minister Gomes Júnior was equally quick to dismiss this news by declaring that "there were never talks about any stabilization force".²⁰ Not a very good omen, to say the least. Especially when instead, he opted to highlight the individual role reserved to Angola in this area, under the defense agreement previously signed.

Ultimately, Bissau-Guineans would be wise not put their absolute trust on a 'miraculous solution'. The

idea of a stabilization force has been frequently used as a stalling tactic by local politicians more interested in keeping the international community attached to the country's fate than actually providing and building the necessary conditions for a mission of this sort. Even more, the experience of the EU's two-year efforts should serve as a constant reminder of how the best intentions, significantly funded and well designed, could easily come to an end when not properly 'nurtured' at a local basis. At the end of day, the facts remain: any outside help will become insufficient and/or unsuccessful if not dully supported by a visible and internal movement of change. In that sense, Guinea-Bissau still has a long way to go.

16 "Guiné-Bissau: Malam e Cadogo entram em 2011 de mãos dadas" (*Jornal Digital*, 30 December 2010).

17 "FMI e Banco Mundial aliviam dívida externa da Guiné-Bissau" (*RFI*, 17 December 2010).

18 "Missão militar conjunta UA/CEDEAO/CPLP em Bissau em Fevereiro" (*RFI*, 7 January 2011).

19 For more on the prospects of a local TRC, see Paulo Gorjão, "A Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Guinea-Bissau: a toothless body, or a dangerous one?" (*IPRIS Viewpoints*, No. 35, January 2011).

20 "Envio de força de estabilização para a Guiné-Bissau "nunca foi falado - PM" (*Lusa*, 7 January 2011).



Timeline of Events

Angola

1 January (Brasília):

Foreign Minister George Chicoty represented Angola at the inauguration of new Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff.

7 January (Kinshasa):

The DRC's government stated that hundreds of its nationals were expelled from Angola during the first week of January in harsh conditions. Relations between the two countries have been tense during the last months because of refugee issues and the delimitation of the maritime border.

10 January (Luanda):

Angolan Ambassador to Portugal José Marcos Barrica stated relations between the two countries were positive, multi-leveled and broad, encompassing diplomatic, economic, civil and cultural ties.

7-11 January (Bissau):

Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Manuel Augusto headed an Angolan delegation to Guinea-Bissau, where it participated in a meeting with President Malam Bacai Sanhá, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and Defense Minister Ocante da Silva. The delegation reviewed with its Bissau-Guinean peers the ongoing preparations for Angola's technical, military and security cooperation with the country, which formally started on January 3rd.

11 January (Luanda):

Following a move already made by incumbent President of Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo, presidential election winner Alassane Ouattara sent emissaries Jean Marie Kacou Gervais and Bakayoko Hamed to Luanda, to meet Angolan Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó'. Angola is increasingly seen as a power broker in the ongoing Ivorian crisis.

12 January (Washington):

Angola ranked at 161th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

13 January (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos raised some eyebrows when he stated, in a speech delivered to diplomats in Luanda, that the UN should not have confirmed Ivory Coast's electoral results - in which several irregularities were denounced - thus legitimizing Alassane Ouattara over Laurent Gbagbo.

13 January (Luanda):

US Chargé d'Affaires in Luanda David Brooks stated that Africa's internal security issues should be solved through international forums if necessary.

14 January (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos expressed his and Angola's condolences for those killed in Brazil's floods to President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff.

15 January (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos, who is also leader of the MPLA ruling party, delivered a speech in the third ordinary session of the party's Central Committee where he described the government's priorities for 2011. Among the main topics were the reinforcement of the banking system and the reform on the National Reserve Bank, an upgrade of the state's statistical services, reforms of defense, national security, judiciary and administrative systems as well as efforts in infrastructure building.

16 January (Luanda):

British Ambassador to Angola Richard Wildash stated in an interview that the world does not yet grasp the importance of Angola in today's international relations - not only in its region but also globally. He pointed out for the country's capacity for conflict resolution, as currently witnessed in Ivory Coast.

17-21 January (Havana):

Angolan Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó', together with the Ministers for Education and Health, visited Cuba, where mechanisms of strengthening relations between the two countries were discussed, particularly in the areas of health care and education.

18-19 January (Luanda):

President of Benin Boni Yayi visited Angola where he met with his counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos. After the meeting, Yayi changed his position on the Ivory Coast crisis and stated, in tandem with Angola's position, that Laurent Gbagbo has some right to stay in power and that Alassane Ouattara should accept a power-sharing agreement. This assertion collided openly with the AU's official position. Yayi also later took the opportunity to meet with the Speaker of the Angolan National Assembly, Paulo Kassoma.

18 January (Luanda):

Oil Minister José Botelho de Vasconcelos declared that the oil refinery in Lobito should be concluded by 2015. This new refinery constitutes a paramount investment which will provide Angola and the region - particularly South Africa - with the necessary fuel to sustain economic growth.

18 January (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Minister George Chicoty met with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Africa Said Djinnit. The situations in Sudan, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Ivory Coast were high on the agenda. Chicoty later stated that visits to the country by various figures linked to Ivory Coast's dossier shows how important the Angolan position is regarding this crisis.

20 January (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos met with deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophone Affairs of Equatorial Guinea Eustáquio Nseng Esono.

**20 January (Luanda):**

Kenyan Prime Minister and African Union mediator Raila Odinga was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos to discuss the current crisis in Ivory Coast. Odinga defends the AU stance on the country, whereas José Eduardo dos Santos is seen as close to Gbagbo's camp. Odinga stated to the press that both were committed to a peaceful solution for Ivory Coast.

24 January (Brussels):

Human Rights Watch released its 'World Report 2011', where it states oil producing countries, and Angola in particular, are sheltered from international pressure thanks to their natural resources.

24 January (Luanda):

Carlos Saturnino, Sonangol's head of operations, confirmed Angola would start to explore its offshore deepwater pre-salt block, thought to be similar to Brazil's. Some 11 blocks were auctioned and in each one the Angolan company maintained a 35% to 50% stake. Portuguese company Galp was not given any rights, although persistent information links Sonangol to a direct entry in the firm's capital.

25 January (Washington):

The IMF approved the disbursement of a further US\$178 million under the US\$1.4 billion loan to Angola. This amount comes after a fourth review of the program and brings the sum already granted to US\$1 billion.

26 January (Oslo):

Statoil confirmed it was awarded with operatorship's and participation shares in a total of five pre-salt deepwater Angolan blocks, which the company regards as potentially very profitable.

27-28 January (Luanda):

President of Guinea-Conakry Alpha Condé paid an official visit to Angola. After meeting Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó', Condé was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos. The two discussed bilateral relations, which were deemed positive, as well as the situation in Ivory Coast. Condé praised Angola's stance on the crisis as pushing towards its peaceful resolution.

28 January (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos received Laurent Gbagbo's Defense and Security advisor Kadet Bertin, who communicated Gbagbo's availability to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Ivory Coast crisis.

30-31 January (Addis Ababa):

President José Eduardo dos Santos represented Angola at the XVI African Union Ordinary Summit. Among others, José Eduardo dos Santos met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who praised Angola's efforts in solving the Ivorian crisis, as well as its support to Guinea-Bissau.

31 January (Luanda):

The Angolan Foreign Affairs Ministry called its first General Council in 15 years to review internal reform measures and reshape its diplomatic network.

Brazil

1 January (Brasília):

Newly-elected Dilma Rousseff took office as President of Brazil, succeeding her mentor Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva. Several foreign leaders were in attendance, such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, Uruguayan President José Mujica, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Bissau-Guinean President Malam Bacai Sanhá, Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates, Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In her acceptance speech, Dilma reaffirmed that she will maintain the foreign policy guidelines of the previous government. Later on, António Patriota also took the oath of office as Brazil's next Foreign Minister.

2 January (Brasília):

President Dilma Rousseff took the opportunity of her inauguration to meet with Spanish Filipe de Borbon y Grecia, Prince of Asturias, Uruguayan President José Mujica, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Hwang-Sik, President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, Cuban Vice-President José Ramón Machado Ventura, former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates. For his part, Foreign Minister António Patriota met with his counterparts from Cape Verde,

Argentina and Armenia, José Brito, Héctor Timerman and Edward Nalbandian respectively.

4 January (Rio de Janeiro):

Brazil's state-controlled oil company Petrobrás confirmed it was in talks with its Italian counterpart ENI to buy its 33% stake in Portuguese company Galp Energia.

10 January (Buenos Aires):

Foreign Minister António Patriota travelled to Argentina where he met with his local counterpart Héctor Timerman and with President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Patriota's goal was to lay the ground for an upcoming visit by President Dilma Rousseff in late January.

10 January (Rio de Janeiro):

According to reports from the Daily Telegraph, Brazil has for the first time ever refused docking privileges to a Royal Navy vessel, in this case the HMS Clyde, bound to the disputed Falkland Islands.

11 January (Brasília):

President Dilma Rousseff met with US Senators John McCain and John Barrasso. Ethanol cooperation and the lobbying for the purchase of 36 US F-18 Super Hornet fighters were high on the agenda.

11 January (Brasília):

It was officially announced that Brazil's regional membership of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) was formally approved. Brazil will thus be able to acquire US\$28 million of the Bank's capital stock which will be channeled to finance economic development projects to decrease poverty and to foster cooperation and integration in the Caribbean region.

12 January (Washington):

Brazil ranked at 113th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

16 January (Buenos Aires):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim travelled to Buenos Aires where he met with his Argentinean counterpart Arturo Puricelli.

17 January (Asuncion):

Foreign Minister António Patriota met with his Paraguayan counterpart Héctor Lacognata and President Fernando Lugo. Bilateral relations



and cooperation within Mercosul and Unasul were high on the agenda.

18 January (Montevideo):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with his Uruguayan counterpart Luis Almagro and President José Mujica. The assessment of bilateral relations and further regional integration under Mercosul and Unasul, were some of the topics covered.

19 January (Brasília):

The Common Market Council announced that former Secretary-General to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães was appointed as Mercosul's High Representative for a three-year term. Guimarães will be in charge of coordinating policies and articulating common proposals between all member-states.

25 January (Brasília):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim confirmed that a decision on the multibillion-dollar fighter aircraft is to be postponed.

25 January (Washington):

In his yearly State of the Union speech, US President Barack Obama announced that he would visit Brazil, Chile and El Salvador in March.

26 January (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, with the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, and with President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso. The follow-up on the Action Plan of the Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership, the upcoming 5th Brazil-EU Summit and negotiations towards an Association Agreement between Mercosul and the European Union were high on the agenda.

27-29 January (Davos):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota represented Brazil in the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Patriota took part in a round table on Haiti's reconstruction alongside the Presidents of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and held bilateral meetings with officials from South Africa, China, India, Australia, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, the United

States and the European Union. He also joined an informal meeting of leaders on the Rio+20 Conference, and an informal Ministers' Meeting, at the invitation of the Swiss government to address the Doha Round.

28 January (Brasília):

After the release of an IMF report stating that the "deterioration in Brazil's fiscal accounts is particularly pronounced" and that the government is expected to miss its 2011 target for a budgetary surplus by a "wide margin", Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega promptly dismissed it, by labeling it as "totally wrong" and "stupid".

31 January (Buenos Aires):

President Dilma Rousseff, accompanied by Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota, paid her first official visit abroad to Argentina where she met with her counterpart Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. The expansion of cooperation in the fields of electricity, nuclear energy, social development projects, digital technology and mining, as well as the development of ongoing regional integration projects, were high on the agenda.

Cape Verde

1-2 January (Brasília):

Foreign Minister José Brito represented Cape Verde in the ceremonies surrounding new Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's oath of office. The following day, Brito also took the opportunity to meet with the newly appointed Brazilian Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota.

2-3 January (Abidjan):

Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires, alongside President of Benin Boni Yayi, President of Sierra Leone Ernest Koroma – representing ECOWAS – and Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, met with Ivory Coast incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and UN recognized President Alassane Ouattara

5 January (Washington):

The board of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) officially announced that Cape Verde would receive a second aid package (compact) from the Millennium Challenge Account. According to Prime Minister José Maria Neves "the amount received will never

be less than the US\$110 million of the first compact".

7 January (Brussels):

Cape Verde and the EU have concluded a three-year deal on fishing that will come into force on September 1st, just after the expiration of their current agreement.

12 January (Washington):

Cape Verde ranked at 65th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

30-31 January (Addis Ababa):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Jorge Borges represented Cape Verde at the XVI African Union Ordinary Summit.

Guinea-Bissau

1 January (Brasília):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá attended the swearing-in ceremony of Brazil's new President Dilma Rousseff.

4 January (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá received the National Assembly's traditional New Year greetings. On the occasion, Sanhá defended the idea of creating a National Reconciliation Commission to pacify the country.

6-11 January (Bissau):

Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Manuel Augusto visited Guinea-Bissau, where President Malam Bacai Sanhá, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and Defense Minister Ocante da Silva received him. The Angolan delegation confirmed that technical and military assistance with Angola was under way, covering areas such as logistics, infrastructure, communications and armament.

6 January (Bissau):

The African Union's representative in Guinea-Bissau, the Angolan Sebastião Isata, confirmed that an AU, ECOWAS and CPLP stabilization force would arrive to Guinea-Bissau in February.

7 January (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior rebuffed Sebastião Isata's declarations and stated that a "stabilization force" was never envisaged



for Guinea-Bissau and that his country was negotiating military assistance only with Angola. This was stated after the Prime Minister received Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Manuel Augusto. This statement was interpreted as a move to calm the military in Guinea-Bissau, although it revealed a clear misunderstanding between the main actors in the country.

10 January (Bissau):

Portuguese Ambassador to Bissau António Ricoca Freire stated that the Portuguese military authorities were reassessing their technical military cooperation with Guinea-Bissau.

10-14 January (Bissau):

An IMF mission led by Paulo Drummond visited Bissau following last month's debt pardon announcement. The delegation was received by Economy Minister Helena Embaló and reviewed the macroeconomics of the country, ongoing reforms, the overall cooperation protocol with Angola and also new forms of collaboration with the Fund. Paulo Drummond stated Guinea-Bissau's debt pardon offered a "new starting point" with more favorable economic bases for growth while he urged the authorities to continue reforms, in particular to the fiscal system. The IMF will return to Guinea-Bissau in March.

11-12 January (Conakry):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá visited Guinea-Conakry, where President Alpha Condé received him. The two discussed how to tackle drug trafficking in both countries, an issue perceived as a threat to the region.

12 January (Washington):

Guinea-Bissau ranked at 159th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

13 January (Bissau):

Guinea-Bissau became the 74th country to recognize Kosovo's independence.

13-21 January (Bissau):

A group of Chinese businessmen visited Guinea-Bissau to identify areas of potential investment, in particular in the agriculture, fisheries, energy and industry sectors. The head of the delegation, Michel Wang, announced China would buy up to 40 tons of fish per day and that it would supply fishing gear.

18 January (Quebo):

In a public move against drug-traffickers, Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai ordered military commanders in the country's southern and interior regions to shoot down any planes without clearance to land. In the same announcement, Indjai also guaranteed that the military would not topple the current political forces.

19 January (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior stated that his government would intensify the fight against drug trafficking. A so-called "mega-surveillance" plan will monitor airstrips especially in the south and interior regions, and some airfields such as the Cufar strip 300 km south of Bissau will become unusable.

20 January (Bissau):

Foreign Affairs Minister Adelino Mano Queta declared that his country needed some US\$310 million to initiate the National Agricultural Investment Plan. The AU and ECOWAS pledged to support this initiative.

21 January (New York):

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Gana Fofang of Cameroon to serve as his Deputy Special Representative in Guinea-Bissau. Speaking to the UN Security Council, Ban Ki-moon stated that Guinea-Bissau's political and social problems derive from its weak institutions.

26 January (Luanda):

A Guinean military judicial delegation, led by Chief Justice of the Military High Court Eduardo Costa Sanhá travelled to Luanda to jointly discuss the reinforcement of cooperation with the Angolan government.

27 January (Lisbon):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior visited Lisbon, where he was received by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho.

29 January (Tunis):

Following a similar move by the IMF, the African Development Bank announced it would pardon Guinea-Bissau's debt of US\$60.4 million. Guinea-Bissau remains eligible for a further US\$131.4 million pardon.

29 January (Bissau):

After calling an emergency council meeting, the government considered the news indicating that the EU would impose sanctions on Guinea-Bissau under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement as "strange" and "biased".

30-31 January (Addis Ababa):

Guinea-Bissau's situation was discussed during the XVI African Union Ordinary Summit, in particular a possible ECOWAS/CPLP/AU mission to the country to prepare a future stabilization mission. Drug trafficking was also under consideration, as well as the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

31 January (Bissau):

Reacting to the news of possible EU sanctions, President Malam Bacai Sanhá reacted by saying he would not see his country's name played with.

31 January (Brussels):

The EU Council adjourned its decision to apply sanctions against individuals – like the current Armed Forces Chief of Staff – involved in the April 1st incidents. The Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado played an important role in the postponement. Nonetheless, the Council decided to open consultations with Guinea-Bissau under the Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement due to disrespect of democratic principles, as well as suspend its support to the country in the field of budget assistance or security sector reform programs.

Mozambique

1 January (Sandy Lane):

The European Union's Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta announced that Somali pirates seized a Mozambican trawler south-west of the Comoro Islands. European officials said the ship was sighted between the Comoros and Madagascar on the 31st of December but was only initially reported as missing.

3 January (Maputo):

Mozambique's Ministry of Fisheries confirmed that the "Vega 5" vessel had indeed disappeared in its southern waters and it was presumed to have been hijacked by Somali pirates.

**12 January (Washington):**

Mozambique ranked at 109th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

27-28 January (Addis Ababa):

In preparation for the upcoming AU Summit, Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói took part in the AU's Executive Council meeting.

28-31 January (Addis Ababa):

President Armando Guebuza travelled to Ethiopia, where he presided over the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) forum. Later on, he joined the works of the XVI African Union Ordinary Summit.

Portugal

1-2 January (Brasília):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the swearing-in ceremony of Brazil's new President, Dilma Rousseff. The following day, both leaders met briefly with Sócrates reaffirming his wish for close bilateral ties and extending Portuguese support to Brazilian aspirations in the UN Security Council.

4 January (New York):

Portugal officially assumed its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Throughout 2011, the Portuguese delegation will preside over the Commission on North Korea and the Working Group on International Courts.

12 January (Frankfurt):

Prime Minister José Sócrates visited Frankfurt's Heimtextil, one of the biggest international trade fairs for home and contract textiles, seeking to boost Portuguese exports.

12 January (Washington):

Portugal ranked at 69th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

13 January (Budapest):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the informal meeting of the Ministers and State Secretaries for European Affairs, with the implementation of the "European Semester" and the preparations for the upcoming European Council high on the agenda.

14 January (Lisbon):

Austrian Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann paid an official visit to Portugal, where he met with Prime Minister José Sócrates and Foreign Minister Luís Amado.

16 January (Doha):

Prime Minister José Sócrates, accompanied by a vast governmental entourage including Foreign Minister Luís Amado, visited Qatar where he met with his counterpart Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani and Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, having also taken part in a local business forum. The enhancement of bilateral economic and trade relations as well as the signing of energy and tourism agreements were among the topics discussed.

17 January (Lisbon):

Bulgarian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Konstantin Dimitrov met with Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie. Bilateral relations, euro-zone issues, Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen Area and the European Neighborhood Policy were some of the issues on the meeting's agenda.

17 January (Abu Dhabi):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the opening ceremony of the World Future Energy Summit, where he showcased Portuguese achievements in renewable energies. Later on, he met with Prince and Vice-Commander in Chief sheik Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nayan as well as with Vice-President and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, seeking to open up possible investment opportunities for Portuguese companies in the region. Sócrates also took this opportunity to meet with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Pakistani President Ali Asif Zardari.

23 January (Lisbon):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva was reelected with 53% of the votes, against his direct competitor Manuel Alegre with only 19% of the votes.

25-26 January (Lisbon):

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman visited Portugal where he met with his counterpart Luís Amado, President of Assembly Jaime Gama and Prime Minister José Sócrates. The Middle East peace process was high on the agenda.

25 January (Dakar):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho and Senegal's Foreign Minister Madické Niang chaired the 1st Joint Portuguese-Senegalese Commission, through which several bilateral agreements, particularly on economic and development aid, and a Memorandum of Understanding on political consultations, were signed. Cravinho also took the opportunity to meet with Minister of State for International Cooperation, Air Transport, Infrastructure and Energy Karim Wade, and with the Minister of State for Economic Affairs and Finance Abdoulaye Diop, as well as with business representatives and President Abdoulaye Wade.

26-27 January (São Tomé):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado paid an official visit to São Tomé and Príncipe, where he met with his counterpart Manuel Salvador dos Ramos, Minister of Finance and International Cooperation Américo Ramos, Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada and President Fradique de Menezes. Political, economic and cultural issues as well as regional matters were high on the agenda. On his way over, Amado also took the opportunity to make a quick stop at Libreville, Gabon, for political consultations with the respective authorities.

30-31 January (Addis Ababa):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho travelled to Ethiopia where he attended the XVI African Union Ordinary Summit, with security issues in Africa like Ivory Coast's political instability, the situation in Sudan or the unrest in Northern Africa, high on the agenda. Cravinho also took the opportunity to hold separate meetings with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and with the President of the ECOWAS Commission.

31 January-1 February (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU's Foreign Affairs Council. The unstable situations in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Ivory Coast as well as new sanctions to Guinean-Bissau's top military officers, were among the topics covered. Amado also took the opportunity to meet with his Slovenian counterpart Samuel Zbogar and with the EU's Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht.



São Tomé and Príncipe

1 January (Brasília):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada attended the swearing-in ceremony of new Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff.

12-15 January (Taipei):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada, accompanied by Foreign Minister Manuel dos Ramos and Development Minister Agostinho Fernandes, paid an official four-day visit to Taiwan, seeking to enhance bilateral ties between the important donor country and São Tomé and Príncipe. Afterwards he also travelled to Malaysia to seek private investment in the country and made a refueling stop in France where he also sought to attract private interest for the construction of a deep-water port in Fernão Dias.

12 January (Washington):

São Tomé and Príncipe ranked at 150th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

13 January (Lagos):

President Fradique de Menezes, together with eight prominent Nigerians, including Speaker of the House of Representatives Dimeji Bankole and three state governors, have won the 2010 Zik Prize in Leadership award.

26-27 January (São Tomé):

President Fradique de Menezes, Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada and Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos met with Portuguese

Foreign Minister Luís Amado, seeking to enhance bilateral ties.

27 January (São Tomé):

São Tomé and Príncipe's Minister of Finance and International Cooperation Américo Ramos announced that following a meeting with representative Kamen Boughada, the Algerian government has decided to pardon the archipelago's foreign debt of US\$3.5 million.

Timor Leste

3 January (Díli):

Timor Leste officials have rejected the draft Timor Leste Human Development Report 2010 issued by the United Nations stating the report is politically biased, cites inaccurate data and most of its conclusions are without a source. The report makes reference to the country's opposition to pursuing the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a statement which was also condemned by national authorities.

12 January (Washington):

Timor Leste ranked 170th in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal's 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.

12 January (Díli):

While presenting the State Budget for 2011, Prime Minister of Timor Leste José Alexandre 'Xanana Gusmão' announced that there are plans to diversify the Oil Fund's investment portfolio.

14 January (Díli):

Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya met with President José Ramos-Horta, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and President of the National Parliament Fernando Araújo. Bilateral cooperation in the fields of technical assistance, fishery, education and energy, together with Thailand's support for Timor Leste's candidacy to ASEAN, were high on the agenda. Piromya also took the opportunity to visit the UNMIT Headquarters where he met with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Timor Leste, Ameerah Haq.

16 January (Jakarta):

During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa was quoted as expressing support for Timor Leste's bid to join the organization.

20 January (Díli):

According to a statement from the State Secretariat for the Council of Ministers, Timor Leste amassed US\$2.172 billion in oil revenues with tax revenues from oil reaching almost US\$1 billion.

27-28 January (Díli):

Timor Leste hosted the fifth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in a bid to help the country push for full membership to ASEAN.

EDITOR | Paulo Gorjão

ASSISTANT EDITORS | Kai Thaler • Laura Tereno • Pedro Seabra

DESIGN | Atelier Teresa Cardoso Bastos PRINTING | Europress

Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)
Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa
PORTUGAL

<http://www.ipris.org>
email: ipris@ipris.org

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1st

EDP ranks top 1 worldwide in the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, in the electricity sector. It reflects our role in the economical, environmental and social dimensions.

For the third consecutive year, EDP is listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, the most widely quoted stock market indicators to track the financial and sustainability performance of companies. This year we are the worldwide leader in our business sector, a recognition that rewards EDP's commitment to sustainable development. A company capable of creating wealth without ever losing sight of the social and environmental aspects. This is the way EDP performs, which reflects all our employees and stakeholders engagement for a better future.



feel our energy